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Careers and organizational goals: managing competing 
interests in cross-sector research and development centres 
 
 
Abstract 
Research of potential socio-economic value is often conducted within cross-sector (government, university, 
business) centres. There has been growing interest among science policy researchers in seeking to understand 
the organizational dilemmas confronted in cross-sector research collaboration. While there is clearly a coalition 
of interests among partners engaged with collaborative research their broader organizational objectives and 
strategies may converge, diverge, or even compete. Yet little empirical evidence exists on (a) how individual 
researchers perceive the benefits of their participation, (b) how far the structures and functions of particular 
collaborative R&D centres coalesce around of researchers’ expectations and, (c) what problems arise for 
researchers who opt for a ‘second job’ in the centre.  Within the broad policy and organizational context of the 
Australian Cooperative Research Centres this chapter presents a qualitative analysis of a survey of respondents 
from public sector organizations and universities involved in the centres. We use the perspective of the 
individual research scientists to illuminate the management issues of trust, governance, and competition 
between functional domains, which emerge from the field of inter-organizational relationships (IOR) and 
which have been inadequately recognized in the context of collaborative R&D centres. The findings have 
implications for the management of the centres, for the careers of research scientists and for public policy. 
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1  Introduction: emerging fissures in the research system 
The unprecedented growth in cross-sector (industry–academic–government) collaboration in 
research and development (R&D) reflects far-reaching changes in the relationship between 
sciences, notably in the organizations that carry out research. R&D is increasingly being 
carried out in organizational forms, such as university–industry collaborative research 
centres, which are built around cross-sectoral and trans-disciplinary teams with well-defined 
socio-economic objectives in mind.  
Two influential models seek to explain the institutional configuration of cross-sector 
R&D observed: the ‘triple helix’ model of university–industry–government relations 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1997) and the ‘Mode 2’ knowledge production of ‘science in 
the context of application’ which (Gibbons et al. 1994) contrast with ‘Mode 1’ traditional 
science pursued within discipline-based structures like university departments. Critics of 
these models argue that they reflect nothing new: that academic research has always been 
heterogeneous in character and comprised elements of trans-disciplinary and strategic 
research (Rip 2000; Ziman 1991). In our view, this overlooks the significance of the new 
forms of collaborative organization, their scale and complexity, their novelty (e.g. as 
distributed or virtual centres) and their effect on existing institutions like university 
departments and disciplines (Turpin and Garrett-Jones 2000). We consider the models 
limited because they fail to explain how the new cross-sector R&D organizations are best 
structured, managed and sustained and how the process of renegotiation takes place between 
the centres and the member institutions. 
Academic staff involved in collaborative research centres in the US generally hold 
continuing appointments in a university department (Boardman and Bozeman 2007) or, in 
Australia, may be researchers with government institutions. Effectively they hold multiple 
jobs or roles. Through their affiliation with the centre, these staff not only accept additional 
responsibility, but responsibilities which may sit incongruently with those in their home 
institution. This arrangement parallels Merton’s observation about the competition for 
resources and potential incompatibility between the multiple roles involved in a position as a 
university professor or scientist in a research organization (Merton and Barber 1976). 
Examples of situations that might lead to work incompatibility (Boardman and Bozeman 
2007) are the different reward and incentive systems in the centres by comparison with 
academic departments, or divergences in research interests between the problem-oriented 
centre and the discipline-based academic department. (Shove 2000:64) speaks of ‘a 
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multiplicity of research regimes’ and ‘a range of settings each of which interprets, values 
and rewards research differently’.  
Life in the ‘triple helix’ has been portrayed in terms of choices made by individual 
researchers in the extent they wish to commit to ‘involvement in multiple worlds’ (Henkel 
2004).  The social scientists surveyed by Shove (2000) were ‘struggling with the stresses 
and strains of simultaneously inhabiting different worlds’. Gulbrandsen (2000) sees it not as 
a question of resolving tensions (e.g. between scientific excellence and utility), but 
balancing them – constructing various individual strategies of ‘portfolio management’, as 
Shove (2000) puts it. Gibbons et al. (1994:48) argue that universities and government 
laboratories have entered ‘the game of dynamic competition’, where ‘knowledge resources 
are held in different organizations and can be shifted between environments which are at one 
moment competitive and at another collaborative’. These environments are not discrete, but 
are populated by actors who ‘move back and forth’, for example, researchers who work 
concurrently in a university department and a centre. While acknowledging the movement of 
researchers, Gibbons et al. (1994:41) on the other hand talk about the ‘strain of 
multifunctionality’ as an institutional challenge affecting, for example, universities and 
professional societies rather than individuals.  
Recent work by Boardman and Bozeman (2007:431) interprets the ‘multiple and 
perhaps conflicting demands of multiple allegiance’ within the ‘unusually complex 
institutional environment of [centres]’ (Boardman and Bozeman 2007:440). It thus covers 
similar ground to the current paper. Boardman and Bozeman’s contribution is to use role 
theory to examine these tensions and to extend the idea of individual ‘role strain’ or ‘role 
conflict’ within a single organization (Box and Cotgrove 1966)1 to encompass the ‘centre-
induced role strain’ that may be produced by working across organizations. As in the current 
paper’s discussion of ‘functional domains’ Boardman and Bozeman (2007:439) examine 
problems at different organizational levels (e.g. within-department or within-centre role 
strain versus centre-department role strain). Rightly Boardman and Bozeman play down Box 
and Cotgrove’s (1966) notion of ‘strain minimization’ as the prime individual response, 
pointing out that, as in the Australian study discussed in this chapter, participants voluntarily 
take on the challenge of working within the setting of a cross-sector research centre. In 
conclusion Boardman and Bozeman quote NSF’s Erik Bloch in saying ‘it’s up to the 
                                                 
1 Role strain results from ‘a lack of congruence between the needs and interests of the individual and the 
demands of the organization’ (Box and Cotgrove 1966:24). 
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individual’ whether or not he/she is prepared to work within a cross-sector R&D centre and 
propose a focus on the ‘personnel management and policy issues’ provoked by such centres.  
We acknowledge the importance of centres for individual researcher’s career choices 
(Turpin et al. 2005) and the salience of the voluntary/cooperative aspect of participation in 
centres. But, in our view, managing the competing demands within cross-sector centres 
cannot be relegated to a problem solely for the individual, or ‘a side effect requiring 
clarification and remedy’ (Boardman and Bozeman 2007:437). Rather it reflects a central 
and deliberate feature of the complex and hybrid institutional environment of collaborative 
research centres and must be specifically addressed when designing management structures 
and regimes for the centres.  
One explicit goal of policies which institutionalize cross-sector multidisciplinary 
research, including Australia’s Cooperative Research Centres (CRC) program, is to 
challenge the conservative norms and cultures of academic disciplines, universities, research 
organizations and firms by exposing them to each others’ cognitively different worlds. It is 
long recognized that productive research teams require a balance between challenge and 
security, a range of ‘creative tensions’ whose dimensions include the relationships between 
science and its application, and between individual independence and organizational 
coordination (Pelz and Andrews 1976). As Nooteboom (2000) points out, one reason why 
inter-organizational networks encourage innovation is that they bring together people with a 
greater ‘cognitive distance’ (CD) between them – an idea akin to the ‘creative tensions’ of 
Pelz and Andrews (1976). Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz (2001:n.p.) ‘expect[s] differences of 
perspective, leading to creative interactions in which the participants can transcend the idées 
reçues of their respective organizations’. Thus the goal is to promote creativity without 
undermining the traditional strengths that the participants bring to the collaboration, such as 
commercial focus, mission-orientation or intellectual rigour. 
Recent empirical work by Cummings and Kiesler (2007, 2005) examines 
coordination and the trade-off between innovation opportunities and coordination costs 
within multi-university research collaboration. The authors find a direct correlation between 
coordination activities, which include ‘relationship development’ (Cummings and Kiesler 
2005:704) and project outcomes, but conclude that coordination costs are a significant 
barrier to collaboration. Their arguments draw upon several institutional-based views of the 
problem: organization theory and forms of coordination, the knowledge-based view of 
collaboration between firms, and theoretical and empirical studies of distributed work 
practices (Cummings and Kiesler 2007) and social network research (Cummings and Kiesler 
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2005). They conclude that the trade-off between the benefits of collaboration and the 
transaction costs is a general issue within distributed innovation systems. 
Use of the role theory lens implies that independent variables related to individual 
scientists’ values and expectations will be relevant. Indeed Box and Cotgrove (1966) 
originally proposed a trichotomy of types of scientist which they linked to particular 
occupational choices. Neither we (Garrett-Jones et al, 2005a, 2005b) nor Boardman and 
Bozeman (2007) compare the views of researchers working within centres with a similar 
group of researchers who avoid centre-based research. What does emerge, however, is a 
rather surprising commonality of views among the centre-based researchers. We have found 
few significant differences in the responses of academic and government researchers to the 
quantitative questions in our survey (Garrett-Jones et al. 2005b). Likewise, Boardman and 
Bozeman fail to find any relationship between role strain and individual variables like 
gender, tenure status or academic discipline. They do however see organizational relations 
factors (such as the formality of relations, or the closeness of ties) as correlated with role 
strain. In our survey, again it was broader organizational factors (such as policies on access 
to national research council grants) that led to divergence of opinion between academic and 
government researchers, rather than factors related to individual motivations for centre 
membership.  
What emerges from the empirical literature on R&D centres is (1) an agreement that 
inhabiting multiple roles, domains or worlds creates new or aggravated sources of tensions 
and problems; (2) an understanding that participation involves a trade-off between the 
benefits and costs of membership, the latter including costs of relationship-building and 
coordination; and (3) that organizational structures, such as degree of bureaucratic or 
participatory management (Chompalov et al. 2002) and activities, such as extent of 
communication (Cummings and Kiesler 2007) are demonstrably pertinent to the success of 
collaborations. However, the literature reveals ambivalence about the relative contribution of 
individual and organizational factors in responding to these challenges. Participation in 
cross-sector centres is voluntary and may be explained in terms of personal attitudes and 
individual choice. But the values held by researchers do not necessarily help in 
distinguishing between those who thrive in cross-sector research environments and those 
who do not. Forms of organization, which vary with factors such research field, scale of the 
collaboration and geographic dispersion, also influence collaborative outcomes. This leads 
Elzinga (2004:8) to be less than sanguine about ‘Mode 2’ and ‘triple helix’ collaborations, 
observing that ‘democratic corporatism’ and ‘convergence and agreement [are 
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emphasized]…while potential conflict and exclusion mechanisms are toned down, giving 
rise to a picture of smooth and peaceful collaboration across institutional borders’. Are these 
tensions unique to cooperative research centres, or do they arise in other forms of inter-
organizational collaboration? 
  
2.  Cooperative research centres as inter-organizational relationships  
In some countries, CRCs are one of the most important mechanisms to foster collaboration. 
They usually take place in countries with strong federal programs, such us the United States, 
Germany and Australia, resulting in a wide and stable national network of centres, through 
which other funding mechanisms are allocated. A recent analysis of Australian CRCs drew 
attention to the ways in which different CRCs have evolved in the Australian system (Turpin 
et al, 2011). According to that analysis, after two decades since its introduction the 
Australian CRC program has reached a ‘policy crossroad’ and it is unrealistic to expect a 
single discrete program to manage the diversity of missions encompassed by the collective 
aims and objectives of organisations and personnel  that comprise the contemporary cohort 
of centres. 
A recent study of cooperative research in Norway has found that project based 
research funding and centre based funding were leading to unexpected differences in the 
extent to which collaboration was becoming institutionalised (Thune and Gulbrandsen, 
2011). Their analysis showed that although centrally funded research centres were more 
formalised in structure and process, they were more weakly institutionalised than research 
collaborations supported through project based funding programs. Thune and Gulbrandsen’s 
explanation for this difference was due to the many different modalities of collaboration and 
the variety of expectations of industry partners. This was a similar observation to the 
Australian analysis noted above with both suggesting a need for greater diversity in the 
design of funding systems directed toward the  promotion of cross sector collaboration. 
Recent studies into cooperative research centres in the United States provide an 
interesting contrast where progressive legislative changes since the 1980s have contributed 
to a huge growth in university based research centres. Gray (2011) has noted that according 
to the 2010 Research Centres and Services Directory there are almost 16,000 university-
based non-profit research centres in the U.S. and Canada, a large proportion of which would 
be similar to the Australian CRCs. Yet, besides this more formal collaborative mode a great 
deal of cross-sector research collaboration takes place between individuals and institutions 
informally and without external policy intervention. Gray’s analysis presents the U.S. 
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experience with cross-sector research collaboration as a diversified system of public policy 
that includes elements of a science policy, technology policy and innovation policy 
producing an innovative ecosystem from basic research to very downstream 
commercialisation efforts’ (Gray, 2011: 131). In this complex policy environment Gray 
points to the pressing need for effective policy coordination and, because of program 
overlap, the redundancy of many programs and initiatives. 
The emergence and consolidation of cross-sector collaborative R&D centres suggest 
the possibility of two separate career paths for scientists: one that progresses through an 
institutional structure such as a university or public research institute and one that is 
embedded in an industrial structure steered much by commercial opportunities, offering 
contract rather than tenured terms of employment. These pathways are not mutually 
exclusive and there is evidence that some scientists move regularly across the boundaries 
(Turpin et al, 1996). However, there is also evidence that diversity in the nature of 
cooperative research centres has contributed to different modes of institutional collaboration. 
Schiller (2011) has drawn attention to the diversity of actors operating in a more bottom-up 
fashion that has lead to the diversity of centres with different roles and impact on their 
national or regional innovation systems. He has argued that the differing expectations of 
scientists and their managing institutions has contributed to a ‘reconfiguration’ of the 
German science system that has influenced both formal organization within the system as 
well as informal practice. In order to better understand this process he offers an analytical 
framework for exploring the separate and different impacts of CSRC programs on (a) 
researchers, (b) the science sector and (c) the innovation system, according to the scope of 
the program, potential reward, and governance procedures. In his final analysis he argues 
that while some program configurations may lead to more formalised modes of governance 
others will continue as informal arrangements because they do not align easily with 
expectations or indeed the organisational structures concerning potential reward. The 
possibility of parallel career paths is certainly one way of ameliorating ambiguity between 
scientists’ differing career opportunities and expectations.  
The growth of cross sector collaborative research centres parallels the emergence of 
inter-organizational relationships (IOR) in business, notably the alliances of firms aimed at 
introducing technologically based new products and services in markets. Such centres and 
alliances can be regarded as a class of inter-organizational relationship, that has been 
variously termed ‘hybrid organization’ (Menard 2004; Lamb and Davidson 2004; Minkoff 
2002), ‘virtual organization’ (Handy 1995; Hatch 1997; Holland and Lockett 1998; 
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Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999) or form of ‘cooperative network’ (Castells 2001; Handy 1993). 
As Chompalov et al. (2002) observe, network forms of organization have been widely 
studied for firms, non-profit and government organizations, but less so for inter-
organizational R&D arrangements.  
The typology and dynamics of these hybrid organizations still remain poorly 
understood. Menard (2004:345-347) notes that hybrid organizations may be thought of as a 
‘heterogeneous set of arrangements’ that ‘rely neither on markets nor hierarchies for 
organizing transactions’. He argues that hybrid organizations ‘form a specific class of 
governance structures’ (Menard 2004:368), which share common characteristics and 
problems. These include the difficulties of coordinating contractual arrangements that 
involve autonomous partners, particularly where a high degree of uncertainty about the 
value of the products of the collaboration is involved; and the fact that they are neither 
driven solely by market considerations, nor subject to the command and control of a single 
organization (Menard 2004). 
The first issue in managing voluntary or loosely contractual relationships is therefore 
managing autonomous partners. If the collaboration is to arise and be sustained, all 
participants must see some benefit that they could not achieve more easily alone or in some 
other way, otherwise there is a ‘credible threat’ of unilateral action, for example, that they 
will unilaterally withdraw (Oster 1994:247). This raises the question of how partners 
(individually or institutionally) initially assess and continue to monitor the benefits and costs 
of their participation in cooperative R&D.  
The notion of risk and trust in IORs is well expounded in the literature. Holland and 
Lockett (1998:606) describe the coalescence of virtual organizations around outcomes, and 
the need to deal with the risk that the outcome may not be achieved: ‘there is a significant 
level of risk associated with the outcome…and organizational trust has been hypothesized to 
be an explanatory variable for the development of such cooperative behaviour’. Nooteboom 
(2000:918) recognizes of two elements of what he calls ‘the slippery notion of trust’. These 
elements are competence (or the capability to deliver the agreed outcomes) and intention 
(the degree to which parties are committed to the avowed goals and avoid opportunism—
that is, putting self-interest above the goals of the group or organization).  
Hybrid organizations not only combine different organizational behaviours, but 
operate across broad and complex organizational environments. In this sense they are truly 
‘boundary spanning’ (Steenhuis and Gray 2006). Minkoff (2002:381) makes the crucial 
observation that ‘hybrid organizations operate in multiple functional domains’, compared 
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with organizations that operate within ‘clearly defined technical and institutional 
boundaries’. Other authors term these functional domains ‘sub-cultures’ or ‘societal sub-
systems’. Nowotny, Scott and Gibbons (2001) talk about hybridization also in the sense of 
combination of scientific disciplines and multidisciplinarity. This allows the idea that 
different functional domains can exist within and across the partner organizations as well as 
between them. As Ziman (1991: 45-47) has shown, universities are quite unlike firms in this 
regard because of their highly segmented components—departments, research centres and so 
on; and the ‘blurred line’ between academics acting as university staff and performing as 
independent entrepreneurs.  We suggest that Minkoff’s term ‘functional domains’ can be 
applied to encompass and extend these ‘different worlds’ and ‘research regimes’ posited by 
Shove (2000) and Henkel (2004). The idea of competition between functional domains thus 
provides an institutional counterpart to ‘role strain’ at the individual level.  
A wide cognitive distance between the participants has the merit of bringing in new 
ideas, but also creates problems of mutual incomprehensibility. The partners will have 
different views—not just about the science of the project, but, as Gibbons et al. (1994) point 
out, also what constitutes ‘fair play’. This raises the question of what is the appropriate 
balance between trust and ‘formal government’ (Menard 2004) required to coordinate cross-
sector R&D organizations, and what ‘governance’ and rules are accepted and enforced. It 
also brings up issues such as what is regarded as legitimate competition, collaboration, 
ownership and reward (Gibbons et al. 1994), and how the objectives and strategies of the 
centre are determined and implemented (Steenhuis and Gray 2006). 
What the IOR literature brings to the discussion is (1) an emphasis on the autonomy  
of partners, and therefore on the benefit-cost equation from each partner’s perspective; (2) 
the extension of the idea of competing roles (at the individual level) into that of competing 
functional domains (at the level of the group or organization); (3) questions related to trust 
and reputation (and its breach), how partners are chosen, how trust is assessed and built, and 
how the risk of opportunist behaviour between partners can be reduced; and (4) questions 
concerning alternative forms of governance for collaborative research and particularly the 
choice between consensual or centralized, directive management.  
These are all essentially management issues that potentially impact on scientists’ 
careers and the strategic directions of cooperative research centers and the organizational 
partners within their structure. Inherent contradictions in the process according to Howells 
and Edler (2011) are a driving force for new forms of institutional governance and 
configurations of relationships, a process that they call ‘structural innovation. Studies of 
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cross-sector research centres in Australia (Turpin et al, 2011) Germany (Schiller, 2011) and 
Norway (Thune and Gulbrandsen, 2011) are providing growing evidence that these hybrid 
organizations are driving ‘structural innovation’ in their national innovation systems. For 
example, in Australia there is evidence that the CRC model is evolving as part of a ‘whole-
of-government approach’ to the implementation of major national policy, such as ‘Clean 
Energy Futures’. As the CRC Association has argued: ‘the CRC model is well suited to 
delivering the innovations that will be necessary to address these challenges’ (Peacock, 
2011). The introduction of broader policy objectives into the management strategies of 
CRCs may serve to provide a stronger scientific base for the broader policy objectives. 
However, it is likely to contribute further to contradictions between career and multi-
organizational objectives. The remainder of this chapter focuses on these competing 
demands in the Australian CRC experience. 
 
3.  Managing identities, divided loyalties and competing interests in 
Australian CRCs. 
 
3.1.  Propositions 
 
This chapter explores the contention that lessons learnt from the management of IORs 
generally are of help in understanding the interactions between the partners in cross-sector 
R&D collaboration, including the experience of individual researchers, the effect on existing 
institutions like academic departments and disciplines and the structure and governance of 
the collaborative centre itself.  
Using qualitative data from a survey of Australian CRC participants we analyze 
participants’ views on the attractions and problems of working within these new 
organizations. We structure the findings and discussion according to three sets of research 
questions:  
(1) What drivers and benefits of centre participation are reported by participants? What 
motivates researchers to found, join and remain in cross-sector R&D centres? 
(2) How are centre identities negotiated and agreed?  What values do participants bring to 
the negotiation; how important is trust between participants and how is it defined? How 
do participants view the governance structures of the centres; how are boundaries and 
rules determined and enforced?; and  
(3) How are divided loyalties and competing demands perceived and resolved? What 
causes researchers to become dissatisfied or disillusioned with these centres, and how 
do they respond? 
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These themes emerged primarily from our initial analyses of the participants’ responses. 
We chose to explore them further because of their resonance with issues raised both in the 
research policy and IOR literature and their bearing on the management of cross-sector 
R&D centres.  
The following section introduces the cross-sector R&D model embodied in the 
Australian Cooperative Research Centres and describes the dynamic policy and 
organizational context within which they operate. This is followed with a description of the 
methods used in the survey of CRC participants and in analyzing the responses. In the 
remainder of the chapter we analyze the opinions of respondents in relation to each of the 
three sets of questions. Finally we consider implications for the management of the CRCs, 
researchers’ careers, and policy initiatives supporting cross-sector, inter-organizational R&D 
centres. 
 
3.2 The Australian Cooperative Research Centres (CRC) Program 
The Cooperative Research Centres are geographically and institutionally distributed 
organizations that rely on the voluntary cooperation of independent partners within a 
contractual framework. There are currently 42 CRCs in operation, covering a wide range of 
industrially-oriented research (such as polymers or advanced automotive technology) and 
national interest research (such as Aboriginal health or greenhouse accounting), each funded 
for an initial seven-year term. They involve collaboration between universities, federal and 
state (provincial) government research agencies, individual firms and various industry-led 
public sector intermediaries. They sometimes engage a chief executive and administrative 
and R&D staff in a central office, but most CRC researchers are employed by their 
university, business or government laboratory where they continue to work, rather than by 
the CRC itself. CRCs are highly complex inter-organizational networks. For example, the 
CRC for Polymers combines 11 participant companies in the plastics industry (two of which 
are spin-offs from the CRC), two large federal government research agencies, 10 
universities, a state government department and another independent cross-sector R&D 
centre. 
 
3.3.1 The dynamics of the CRC Program 
As the Program has matured an increasingly pertinent issue has been the extent to 
which cross-sector activities satisfy evolving program objectives and whether the specific 
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organizations that have emerged are sufficiently flexible and adaptable to deal with 
emerging challenges in end-user focussed activities. Table 1 summarises CRC Program 
objectives from inception to the most recent funding round (March 2010). 
The objectives of the CRC Program have changed substantially over time, notably 
becoming far more condensed as Program thinking moved from implementation toward 
outcomes. The O’Kane Review (2008: 22) assessed the most significant change in emphasis 
as occurring around 2004-06, finding it ‘quite marked: on growth, research users, and 
research adoption/commercialization… the focus was on harder-edged outcomes for end-
users’. The Productivity Commission (PC), in its earlier (2007) review of public support for 
science, also noted the move away from foci on research excellence and postgraduate 
training, and broad-based definitions of national and social benefit. The Productivity 
Commission (2007) argued that the emphasis on commercialization over early-stage R&D 
was risky from a public investment perspective. It created a strong likelihood that CRC 
collaborations were substituting for R&D that firms or industries would have conducted 
anyway, in the absence of CRCs, and that selection committees would favour 
‘collaborations that pursue less risky project outcomes involving lower levels of spillover 
benefits’ (Productivity Commission, 2007: 447-8).  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
The response of the Australian Government to these independent reviews, and the 
substantial weight of support for these views contained in stakeholder input to them, was to 
move the Program objectives back toward their earlier focus. This included a reinstated 
emphasis on public good outcomes (social and environmental benefit), end-user focused 
education and training programs, and SME strategies designed to augment firm R&D 
capacity and innovation capability. The most recent Program Guidelines also de-emphasise 
commercialization and shift toward a broader basket of activities to ‘deploy research outputs 
and encourage take up by end-users’ (DIISR 2010a: 1). The definition of end-user includes 
all public organizations, communities or private industries capable of deploying research 
outputs from CRCs. For example, an end-user of a health focused CRC’s research output 
may be a public health authority, just as it may be a private pharmaceutical firm or a not-for-
profit organization. 
It is interesting to consider how changes in program objectives reflect policymaker 
expectations in terms of the actors engaged with centre activities. The earlier incarnations of 
the CRC Program envisaged hybrid actors formed through bottom-up initiatives amongst 
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coalitions of researchers and organizations. As economic actors these early CRCs could be 
considered science-push joint ventures, with expectations of their activities more about 
system coordination, capacity building and emergent collaborations than about direct market 
impact. In more recent times expectations became framed more strongly by demand-pull 
initiatives, particularly once activities were explicitly expected to produce a direct financial 
return on public investment. CRCs became faced with challenges presented by a range of 
economic activities that can broadly be referred to as ‘marketization’ activities (Çalişkan and 
Callon, 2010). These include activities such as venture capital sourcing, market feasibility 
studies, promoting prototypes, licensing products etc, which are required to bring a product 
to the attention of financiers, buyers and other types of commercial actors operating in and 
around markets. CRCs, instead of being intermediate organizations producing outputs for 
commercialization by specialist marketization actors, were expected to become directly 
involved in carrying out these activities themselves. The policy re-orientation was partly due 
to a continuing perception of weak science output commercialization capabilities amongst 
Australian SMEs (OECD, 2004). However, the focus on commercialization activities 
provided a range of significant challenges to CRCs, including broadening the expertise 
required within the organization, with the accompanying risk of weakening the focus on 
research excellence, training and other missions. 
The relationships between the evolution of Program objectives, expanded Centre 
activities and forms of organization structure are important to note here. Perhaps the clearest 
example in this regard is in relation to intellectual property (IP) arrangements. In general, 
CRCs are either incorporated tax exempt legal entities or unincorporated joint ventures. 
While incorporated CRCs can act fully as a commercial agent and directly hold IP, 
unincorporated joint ventures have a principal agent and administering authority (usually a 
University) and often establish an external legal entity for commercial transactions including 
IP. From 2002, the government preference was for CRCs to become incorporated (OECD, 
2004), fitting with the vision of CRCs becoming economic actors more fully engaged with 
marketization activities. Despite this, many CRCs preferred at this time to remain 
unincorporated, with a key public sector member holding IP developed within the CRC. 
Instead, legal entities were spun off from CRCs to deal with the challenges associated with 
holding IP and negotiating commercial agreements. In effect, CRCs appeared somewhat 
ambivalent on the question of functioning as economic actors fully engaged in marketization 
activities, preferring rather to create a third-party structure to cope with extended 
commercial imperatives. However, as older CRCs finished their funding period and newer 
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CRCs came into existence the overall balance of the Program shifted toward incorporated 
structures. By mid-2010, just eight of 42 CRCs (19%) were not incorporated (DIISR, 
2010b), indicating the previous Program objectives had influenced CRC structures in the 
medium term. It will be some time before the marketization capabilities of current CRCs can 
be realistically assessed. With the most recent changes to Program objectives de-
emphasising commercialisation, it also remains somewhat unclear as to what extent 
incorporated CRCs will pursue this activity directly. 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
A second important change in the structure of the CRCs has been driven by trends in 
the sectoral contributions to R&D and innovation in Australia. Table 2 shows government 
funding and participant contributions for each round of CRCs from 1990 to 2006. Over the 
life of the program nearly A$12 billion has been invested in the centres through government 
grants and partner-contributed funds or ‘in-kind’ contributions. The government grant to the 
centres has leveraged about three times its cost in funding from other partners. Each CRC 
requires a higher education partner and it is no surprise that universities are the major 
contributors to CRCs, providing at least one-fifth of the resources in each funding round. In 
the 2000 and 2002 rounds universities’ contribution exceeded 30 per cent of CRC resources, 
leading some universities to find themselves overexposed to the CRC Program. O’Kane 
noted that Go8 (large, established metropolitan) universities were becoming increasing 
reluctant to participate in new CRCs (O’Kane, 2008). While the Go8 dominate, contributing 
around half of the university resources to CRCs, the proportion of university resources from 
the non-Go8 university grew slightly from 47.7 per cent in the first five rounds to 51.4 per 
cent in the second five rounds. Three trends in the data in Table 2 mirror the broader 
changes in the national innovation system. First is the general increase in industry funding to 
the centres. As a proportion, industry and industry association contributions to the centres 
grew from 16.4 per cent of the centres’ budgets in the first five rounds to 21.5 per cent in the 
second five rounds. Second, the universities’ contribution also grew proportionally from 
21.8 to 26.5 per cent of the centres budget. Lastly, and most markedly, is the decline in 
CSIRO participation in the Centres, from 17 per cent of resources in the 1990 round to less 
than 3 per cent in the 2006 round. Overall, CSIRO’s contribution declined as a proportion of 
resources from 14.7 per cent in the first five rounds to 7.1 per cent in the latter five rounds.  
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From being a three way collaboration of university, industry and government researchers the 
CRCs are now dominated by bilateral partnerships of universities and industry.  
The third point we wish to make here is the great diversity in the objectives and 
aspirations of the CRCs themselves. The outputs from CRCs provide an indication of what it 
is that they value. Output ‘value’ is clearly articulated in centre research and management 
plans. In a collection of CRC output data (Garrett-Jones & Turpin, 2002) centres were asked 
to nominate what they described as their most valued outputs. Academic publications 
outputs are highly valued in terms of benefit to careers and academic research funding. 
Interestingly, apart from the typical research breakthroughs and advances made in their key 
fields, a wide range of activities were nominated. For example, the following outputs were 
defined by some CRCs as among their most ‘valued’ achievements: 
• A forestry CRC described their Forestry ‘Tool Box’, information sheets 
distributed at field days and agricultural shows as a significant output (rural 
manufacturing sector). 
• In contributing to their community awareness objective the CRC for 
conservation management initiated the ‘Great Australian Marsupial Night-
stalk’ a community based spotlight surveys involving people of all ages from 
all over Australia (environment sector). 
• The Centre for Mining technology and equipment noted that they specifically 
targeted trade journals, magazines, newspapers as a key mechanism for 
diffusing research outcomes (mining and energy sector). 
• The Aboriginal health CRC specifically targets Aboriginal health workers for 
professional training rather than typical PhD or Masters programs (medical and 
health sector). 
These are clearly valuable outputs in terms of the CRC objectives and are directly 
aligned with their Centres’ objectives and strategies. But in practice valued outputs from the 
perspective of individual researchers and centre managers may vary. Further, how they align 
with the organisational priorities and institutional structures that determine researchers’ 
careers or with the performance measures and the funding formulae imposed by the federal 
government is another matter. But unless their value is aligned with other varying centre 
outputs there will be the possibility for tension between the career expectations of 
researchers and the development expectations of CRCs.   
The above discussion leads us to several conclusions on the dynamics of the CRCs as 
cross sectoral R&D centres.  
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1. There is still an active debate about the role and scope of the CRC program, 
including (1) how broadly should we define ‘industry and other end-users of 
research’ in the context of the CRCs and other collaboratives; (2) what is an 
appropriate balance between ‘commercial’ and ‘public good’ research within 
various schemes; and (3) should programs such as CRCs legitimately support 
research which primarily benefits only one company? In other words, how far 
should CRCs span the spectrum of public, socially oriented research on the 
one hand, and appropriable industrial research on the other? 
2. Over time, and due to structural changes in Australia’s public research sector, 
CRCs have become dominated by industry and academic researchers and have 
moved away from government involvement both directly (government 
researchers) and indirectly (CRC program grants).  
3. We have argued that a push to ‘marketization’ risked the CRCs becoming too 
conservative in their research agendas, and thus less attractive to academic 
researchers. Whatever policies guide cross-sector R&D collaboration, they 
need to allow for the demonstrated great variance in objectives and outputs. 
Following a period of emphasised commercial orientation, the funding 
guidelines and structures of individual CRCs have recently become more 
heterogeneous, both in the funding period, the mode of organisation and scope 
of disciplinary research permitted.  
Our purpose here is not to pursue each of these debates in detail. Rather it is to show 
that the nature of formalised cross-sector R&D collaboration has changed significantly in 
several important dimensions related to objectives, performance measures and organization 
even over the course of a single government program – the CRC program. We note that each 
centre’s context is shaped by national policy and funding regime, factors specific to the 
disciplinary and sectoral environment of the centre, and factors specific to the collaborating 
institutional partners.  The management of the centres operate within this context and these 
constraints. 
 
3.3 Research Methodology 
The results reported in this paper come from a ‘research culture’ survey of respondents (n = 
370) from public sector organizations involved in the management and conduct of 
collaborative R&D in the Australian Cooperative Research centres, which was carried out in 
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2004-05. The paper presents a qualitative analysis of the comments from 209 of these 
respondents who chose to answer ‘open ended’ questions in the survey. 
A written, mixed-mode (postal and web-based) survey (Diment & Garrett-Jones 
2007) targeted a non-random but representative sample of about 1100 staff involved in the 
management and conduct of CRC-based research in public sector organizations – i.e. 
excluding industry partners which were the subject of a parallel study (Fulop & Couchman 
2006). The survey achieved a 34 percent response rate. Respondents comprised researchers 
and research managers from 37 CRCs, most of whom were involved directly as formal 
participants. The majority (53 percent) of respondents identified themselves as from the 
higher education sector, with 21 percent from the government research sector (see Table 1). 
The respondent set was quite homogeneous: 82 percent of the respondents were men, 77 
percent held a doctoral degree, and 11 percent held a masters degree. Two-thirds of the 
respondents had participated in one CRC only, while the rest had been involved with 
between two and seven CRCs. 
The survey questionnaire presented 48 propositions about the respondent’s 
experience with the CRC program. Analysis of these responses permitted a quantitative 
ranking of the main benefits and problems in CRC participation, the management strategies 
adopted, and the effect of CRC participation on research careers (Garrett-Jones and Turpin 
2007) and comparison between the views of academic and government researchers (Garrett-
Jones et al. 2005). The final question (optional) in each section allowed an open-ended 
response to the themes of benefits, problems, administration issues and impact on career. Of 
the respondents 209 (or 57 percent) chose to respond to one or more of the optional 
questions. Their characteristics were almost identical to the full respondent group in terms of 
their gender, highest qualification, length of time with the CRC and where they were 
employed (Table 2) except that the miscellaneous ‘other’ group (which includes past 
participants) is over-represented. The respondents did not seem unduly constrained by our 
themes and furnished comments on a wide range of issues.  
Every response was analyzed with the assistance of the QSR NVivo 2 software. 
NVivo is a database management program designed for exploring complex unstructured 
qualitative data. The program permits dynamic coding (establishment of categories and the 
tagging of particular passages or words in the responses to one or more of these categories) 
of selected passages from the responses and querying of the data by category, by respondent 
and by other independent variables.  
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Analysis was framed initially under the four themes of the survey: benefit, problems, 
management strategies and career impacts (positive and negative). We then created 
hierarchies of nodes in NVivo to capture and categories all of the respondent comments 
from the survey that we deemed material, as in Chart 2. One of the benefits of the program 
is that these nodes are dynamic and can overlap: a respondent’s comment, or part thereof, 
can be referenced by multiple nodes. This allowed us to explore responses both from the 
perspective of the individual respondent and their institutional affiliation, and the 
perspective of institutional setting or functional domain to which they attributed particular 
benefits or problems of centre membership. We then extracted views that seemed relate to 
the issues identified from the literature: the cost/benefit determination made by respondents 
– how they described the benefits of participation and decided that the benefits outweighed 
the costs; different forms of trust and how they were assessed; and governance of the centres 
and causes of and responses to dissatisfaction.  
The choice of respondents’ comments reported here is subjective, but we have tried 
to reflect the range of views and to balance disparate views where these exist. We note that 
the respondents’ comments do not necessarily reflect the views of all respondents as 
reflected by the survey as a whole. The more disaffected respondents may be ‘self-
selecting’, for example. However, this does not detract from the value of the results in 
highlighting potential problems for the management of the centres.  
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
4  Findings 
4.1 Drivers of centre participation 
The motivating factors underlying individuals’ choices to join CRCs concerned mainly 
intangible benefits. These included widening the range of scholars available for 
collaboration, better access to industry partners and working with a larger cohort of scholars 
with similar scientific interests. These expectations were expressed in similar terms by 
almost all participants, irrespective of their sectoral background. In short, the expectation of 
intensive research cohesion around a group of researchers from government, universities and 
industry was the main attractor for most participants in the survey. Respondents reported 
significant benefits in membership of their CRC. Indeed, two government researchers were 
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effusive: ‘my association with the CRC has been extremely beneficial and rewarding and I 
can think of few downsides to my participation in the CRC’; and ‘it is one of the best things 
that has happened for me’.  
The CRCs provided material resources; both financial and human. Senior academic 
respondents nominated ‘money for continuing research activities’, with ‘greater stability and 
longer-term funding’ than available elsewhere. Government researchers mentioned funds for 
staff and ‘generous PhD scholarships’ and for research communication activities such as 
‘opportunities for conference attendance/workshop participation not otherwise supported by 
my organization’. 
Most benefits identified were intangible and came from the interaction with partners 
in the CRC. Comments praised the value of peer relations with researchers in their own 
field: ‘membership in a group of otherwise disparate scholars’; ‘a spirit of belonging to a 
broad research community’; or simply ‘access to ideas’. These contacts were either 
unavailable through their home organization, or more difficult to arrange: ‘If I weren’t 
associated with the CRC I would be working mostly in isolation’ said a postdoctoral 
researcher. Some researchers reported a significant cost in not being part of a CRC, because 
it provided an element that was otherwise missing from the respondent’s ‘scientific domain’. 
The CRC not only embedded the researchers in their peer groups, it also helped them 
to broaden their research perspectives through positive interaction with scientists working in 
other disciplines. For one academic environmental scientist, it ‘opened up my eyes to a 
different approach to research’.  
Other benefits nominated by both academic and government respondents were 
directly related to their own careers and capabilities. This ranged from employment to 
assisting with career progression: ‘greatly increased scope and confidence…in applying for 
senior jobs’; or other personal goals: ‘promised opportunities to remain in a rural town’; 
‘spin-off company giving broad experience and consulting work post-retirement from the 
university and CRC’. Involvement with the CRC led to new personal skills, notably in 
management and leadership It ‘allowed me to fulfil or expand [my] scientific management 
aspiration’ explained a government agricultural scientist); gave one respondent a ‘better 
understanding of IP management and commercialization’; and for an academic, ‘got me to 
work more efficiently (to meet deadlines)’. 
Comments also related to consolidating or changing participants’ research direction. 
Several respondents commented on the value of closer relations with industry, and provision 
of a business or commercial focus for their research. One late-career researcher gained a 
 
21 
‘wider view of my research area, especially with respect to application of results in 
industry’. The CRC allowed one ex-government researcher to ‘continue to undertake 
research in the same field as that for my PhD’. For a senior government researcher, 
‘networking and identification of other commercial/clinical areas have re-focused my 
research career’.  
Benefits for research groups within the partner organizations were also identified. 
CRC involvement provided a ‘means of uniting the interests of [university] departmental 
members who would otherwise have quite disparate interests’. For one government 
researcher, the ‘program [gave] a strong strategic focus for a major research group in [my 
organization]’. Others found that improved status and recognition had resulted: ‘a useful 
lever to get better support within my organization’; and ‘the CRC has increased my visibility 
among peers and industry partners’. 
The benefits identified by respondents were varied, but they overwhelmingly related 
to the domain of ‘science’ and the quality of the research they personally, and within their 
immediate research groups, were able to do. They valued the improvement in their 
interaction with the scientific community, the perspectives that researchers in other 
disciplines and institutions brought to their research, and the view of ‘different ways of 
doing things’ that interaction with commercial firms gave to their research. They were 
closely aware of the personal benefits to them as career researchers, for continuing the kind 
of work they found productive, extension of their skills and career prospects, and their 
standing within their institution and the scientific community. While they valued the 
cohesion that the focus of the CRC work gave to their research group or department, they 
rarely expressed benefit in terms of advantage to their organization per se. Their perspective 
of benefit was almost solely on what we might term the ‘scientific’ and ‘academic’ domains. 
 This ‘science-based’ view of the benefits also influenced our respondents’ views of the 
costs of participation. Broadly, anything that distanced them from the network of high 
quality researchers, or diverted them from their own research, was seen as a cost. These 
costs emerged when we looked at the role of trust and competition in developing a cohesive 
group identity for the centre. 
 
4.2  Negotiating centre identities 
Like many new organizational structures newly established CRCs undergo a period of 
organizational identity building. Drawing the constituent elements into a coherent 
organizational culture is, in a sense, a community activity. Building trust, negotiating 
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priorities, and steering a common course through potential rewards and risks are all part of 
this process. The impression of the centres received from the respondents’ comments is one 
of a rather fragile coalition of interests. The ‘glue’ that holds this collaboration together is 
firstly mutual trust between the participants, and, second, a range of formally agreed 
activities and rules. 
 
4.2.1  Perceptions of trust 
Both trust in competence and trust in intention (Nooteboom 2000) were important in the 
minds of our respondents when describing relations with their partners in the CRCs. 
Competence expressed itself particularly in respondents’ assessment of the quality of the 
researchers in the collaboration: 
Inconsistent calibre of researchers—the CEO was not in a position to tell research 
agencies that their researchers were inappropriate (because of their skills or 
performance) the CRC had to adopt a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach. It was 
slowed down by its weakest members (CRC survey respondent, 2005). 
 
In the view of another respondent, ‘company members supply their second-level staff’. 
Initial selection of partners was seen as crucial, and yet a government respondent made the 
criticism that the quality of the researchers appeared to be a secondary consideration: 
The university with the most knowledge may not necessarily be working on the project. 
Who is doing the work is more likely to be the uni that initiates the proposal (CRC 
survey respondent, 2005). 
 
Respondents also identified partners as unable (rather than unwilling) to manage themselves 
to deliver appropriate inputs, rather than lacking in scientific competence: ‘lack of vision by 
industry partners’ said a senior manager of the CRC, and ‘very little feedback on the 
adoption of research outcomes by industry/partner agencies/stakeholders’ commented a 
senior government researcher. Criticising a specific government agency, one respondent 
claimed: 
…[named agency] is the bureaucracy-laden, meetings/talkfest focused organization, not 
the CRC; CRC staff are too busy doing what industry actually wants and thereby get 
another term to waste the amount of resources [named agency] staff do (CRC survey 
respondent, 2005). 
 
Generally, however, failings by other partners resulting in ‘competition at the expense of 
collaboration’ were interpreted in terms of the party’s self-interest and lack of commitment, 
rather than their incapacity. Both individuals and organizations were nominated as 
opportunist and unwilling to collaborate openly and fairly: ‘certain individuals from other 
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academic institutions [forgot] that the first ‘C’ stands for cooperative’; and ‘some 
institutions are NOT ‘cooperative’ said several academic respondents. 
In summary, respondents lost faith in their partners when they were: (1) viewed as 
poor quality researchers, (2) viewed as incapable of delivering knowledge, results or 
feedback, or (3) seemed to lack commitment to the ethos of cooperation or were perceived to 
be pursuing their own ends. 
Two factors commonly mentioned that led to this lack of trust were: (1) inadequate 
commitment of resources (usually people and money)—either actual or perceived (or 
unverifiable), and (2) domination of or undue influence on the direction of the collaboration 
or of the potential rewards. Academics and government respondents suggested that he way 
that CRCs were structured made it difficult for partners to assess whether each other was 
‘pulling their weight’. ‘Costing models between partners are wildly different and project 
budgeting is a major source of mistrust’, said one. Reneging on commitments was viewed 
seriously: ‘ensuring in-kind contributions match commitments’; ‘multi-partner programs are 
unwieldy when [the] percentage commitment of individual staff is low (<30%) and over-
ridden by host institution priorities’ were raised as problems. ‘Inflexible and one-sided IP 
arrangements’ were also viewed with distrust as a form of self-interest. 
The factors contributing to the maintenance of trust between partners appeared 
similar to other IORs, but judgments of trustworthiness were made more difficult by the 
inherently unmeasurable nature of R&D outcomes and difficulty of assessing the actual 
level of resources (particularly ‘in-kind’ staff time) actually being committed by the 
partners. The actions that seemed to be regarded as most trustworthy were: being able to 
carry out quality research, exchanging information and knowledge, executing agreed tasks 
and generally being accommodating to and cooperative with other partners. 
The challenge to both individual and institutional participants in the centres was to 
‘make stronger efforts together to achieve the main aim’ and acknowledge ‘each other’s 
needs and goals’, in the view of one CRC employee; or simply, ‘to learn how to cooperate 
rather than compete’ by a university-based respondent. In the following section, we consider 
what implications these views have for the governance of CRCs.  
 
4.2.2  Perceptions of governance 
The role of governance is to unite the CRC around agreed strategies and to reconcile various 
goals. There is also formal obligation to report to the partners and the funding agency on 
research projects and outcomes. Surprisingly, respondents were quite ambiguous about the 
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governance of the centres and regarded these activities as unnecessary costs. Many found 
administration frustrating, cumbersome and burdensome. ‘Transaction costs are very high’ 
and ‘there is a large administrative cost linking different institutions’; ‘dual reporting needs’, 
were typical responses when asked about problems with the management of the CRC. 
Transaction costs were viewed as more onerous than with alternative forms of research 
support: ‘compared to an [Australian Research Council] grant, a CRC has a much greater 
administrative cost and suffers from the possibility that the funds can be altered through the 
life of a project’ commented a senior academic. Respondents found the CRCs cumbersome 
and unresponsive in more commercially-oriented activities too: ‘slow processes with regards 
to commercialization, licensing and marketing’ charged one information technology 
academic. 
Respondents commonly criticised the centres’ (and the program’s) governance 
activities because of their detrimental effect on research. The management burden distracted 
them from their main concern of carrying out research: a ‘massive percentage of funds spent 
on administration rather than research’; and, ‘the CRC reporting requirements strongly 
impinge upon research time and activities’ were typical claims. Another academic was 
annoyed about ‘arbitrary decisions to reduce committed funding to enable ‘communication’. 
A further point of contention was the ‘politicking’ and power relations within the 
centres. As one senior academic succinctly put it: ‘if you can capture the centre, you are 
provided for; if not you are marginalised’. ‘Autocratic leadership; high staff turnover; lack 
of communications; lack of transparency on employment of researchers’ were some of the 
specific problems listed. ‘This is a not a collaborative organization…internal politics rather 
than rational assessment of priorities determines resource allocation’; and administration 
seemed ‘pointless’, with ‘no management feedback even to project leaders’ claimed two 
academic respondents. 
Some respondents felt ignored, ‘I do not have much say in the affairs of CRC. I 
know I have the capacity to contribute more but no takers’. Others felt controlled, ‘we get 
told what to do’, or even coerced: ‘many of us were put in the [nominated] CRC by senior 
[university] management without any discussion in order to meet…targets shown in the 
proposal. Most of us were not even aware of the proposal, nor asked if we wished to be 
involved… Attempts to be removed from the [nominated] CRC were met with threats of 
dismissal’. 
Two main findings emerge. The first is the ‘coordination burden’ or increased 
transaction costs of complex cross-sectoral, multi-organizational collaboration. Respondents 
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expected their ‘CRC experience’ to be about research, not about administration. This was 
particularly felt when feedback and communication were lacking. The second is the 
expectation of collegiality and cooperation in the governance of the centres. The respondents 
demanded a strong say in the strategy and running of the CRC and were unhappy when they 
were not consulted and engaged. 
Negotiating a CRC ‘identity’ is revealed as very much a collective process. But it is 
not simply generating a coalition of interests from participating partner organizations. It is a 
social process of defining boundaries: who we are; what we do; what is acceptable and what 
is not; who is in and who is out.  It is these very individual definitions as much as any 
organizational expectation that drives centre identity building.  
 
4.3  Resolving competition  
To the extent that individual expectations are part of the ‘centre building’ process there are 
likely to be conflicts of interests or divided loyalties, particularly among those on part-time 
secondment to CRCs. As noted, researchers generally commit only part-time to the CRC and 
remain based in their ‘home’ organization—their university or government laboratory. This 
led to respondents’ experiencing the symptoms of ‘role strain’, identifying overload and 
‘divided loyalties as an issue, particularly with long running CRCs’. Having two masters 
made it harder to work within the CRC framework than on projects which were less 
complex in structure, as one government researcher observed: 
It is a constant challenge to meet the multi-layered management requirements of both 
[the home organization] and the CRC. There is potential for both conflict and 
administrative overload, which makes CRC participation significantly harder work 
(albeit rewarding) than simply working 100% on [the home organization] projects (CRC 
survey respondent, 2005). 
 
Another government-based respondent interpreted this as losing control of the project: 
…organizational commitment to allowing time (that is, having time left over from other 
organizational duties to dedicate to CRC projects) which means much of the running of 
the projects is necessarily left to university researchers (CRC survey respondent, 2005). 
 
‘Interaction with parent institution’ and ‘an inherent problem of split loyalty between the 
employer and the CRC’ were identified as problems by a large number of respondents: ‘[it 
is] difficult to know who is the master, the CRC or [the partner]’. A senior manager 
employed in a CRC, saw it more starkly: ‘their host organization always dominates the 
researcher priority as that is who promotes and pays them’. 
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Several sources of conflict were identified. The first was competition for resources—
primarily researchers’ time between the work of the CRC and the work of the parent 
organization. Researchers felt pulled between their ‘regular job’ and their commitment to the 
CRC: ‘meeting deadlines due to ‘normal’ core commitments’; and ‘too much of my time 
spent in managing researchers and contracts for the CRC’. But rather than seeing the issue 
simply as one of individual choice, they criticised their organization. One academic 
complained that ‘my university/school has not honoured my in-kind contribution to the 
CRC’. A government researcher similarly observed ‘I was a program leader in the CRC. I 
don’t think I was properly supported in the role by my own organization’. Researchers had 
chosen to work with the CRC and expected their employer organization to support them and 
to manage any conflicts. When the organization did not, this competition for resources could 
affect researchers who were not affiliated with the CRC, and give rise to competition within 
the partner organization, as in the case of this university: 
The CRC research and time commitments done by faculty in our school who have 
contract agreements is being subsidised by another faculty. This is because no [money] 
was given to the school to cover the teaching and administrative responsibilities of these 
faculty members. It has led to a major rift within our school and has severely impacted 
the ability of non-CRC committed faculty to engage in research (CRC survey 
respondent, 2005). 
 
The second conflict was between the ways that CRC acted and the practices and norms of 
the partner organizations. A senior manager in government characterised this as a ‘clash in 
management ethos between [the CRC’s] CEO and the practice of the participating 
organization’, while a CRC manager commented on the participants ‘interfering with 
management structures of other parties’. This was found in communication, timing of 
activities, accepted protocols for supervision of research students and so on: the ‘CRC 
attempts to control [postgraduate] students with no regard to supervisors’, claimed a senior 
academic; while a senior government researcher countered: 
[The] main work force in CRC [is] derived from PhD students. This leads to a conflict 
between research and commercial priorities. Students need to do work to complete their 
PhDs whereas industry is focused on producing products (CRC survey respondent, 
2005). 
 
Another academic respondent welcomed ‘funding for students’ as a benefit, but noted that 
‘regrettably [the funding] does not go through university channels’ and thus did not earn 
matching funds from university block grants for research. 
A particular conflict was identified between the work of the CRC and the reward 
structures of the partner organization. This could have a direct and immediate effect on the 
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career of the researcher if the researcher’s service was not recognized by the partner 
organization: 
When my contract with [nominated agency] expired…I had worked for the organization 
[for more than seven years]. However, I was advised I was ineligible for ‘indefinite’ 
appointment because I had been a CRC associate employee for most of this time! So no, 
I got no benefit from being a CRC employee with [nominated agency] (CRC survey 
respondent, 2005). 
 
In many cases, as an early-career researcher employed by a CRC observed, 
‘researchers in CRC do not have [a] clear career path’. Often, the impact was more subtle. 
‘The research success of an employee in a CRC project may not necessarily be properly 
acknowledged by the employer’ said a semi-retired respondent. Another, seconded to a CRC 
at a senior level, found a ‘complete disjoint between performance appraisal by my employer 
and my actual work in CRC’.  
Conversely, the requirements of the CRC might prevent or stifle peer recognition of 
the researcher, either by their employer, or in their wider scientific peer group. Two areas 
specifically identified were: (1) constraints on free publication and (2) access to prestigious 
research grants from bodies such as the Australian Research Council (ARC). Several 
academic respondents nominated ‘publication restrictions’ and ‘delays in publishing while 
CRC makes decisions about IP protection’. Another academic who had experienced 
publication delays lamented, ‘the short-term objectives of the CRC are destructive for an 
academic career’. Ineligibility for ARC funding in particular was hard felt by academics. It 
potentially hampered recruitment to the CRC and collaboration with researchers outside the 
CRC, as a senior government researcher noted: 
Academics on ARC funding [are] very unwilling to collaborate lest ARC and CRC 
support is seen to mix—a number of very exciting and important collaboration 
opportunities [were] lost as ARC funded researchers were unwilling to ‘risk’ their ARC 
support by taking benefit from CRC projects (CRC survey respondent, 2005). 
 
Because CRCs bring together research and commercial interests, it is not surprising that 
a further field of conflict within the CRC can be a philosophical clash between the rationale 
of CRC and its industry partners and the norms of ‘science’. This may not adversely affect 
immediate rewards, but some researchers clearly felt uncomfortable about the direction of 
the CRC and the balance of its activities. Comments by academics on particular CRCs 
included: ‘too much emphasis on commercial outcomes and not enough emphasis on 
research’; ‘lack of scientific vision —short-term objectives prioritised’; ‘suppression of truly 
innovative basic research’. Conversely, a senior government researcher charged that ‘some 
academic researchers [are] biased against ‘applied’ CRC research’. Criticism was also made 
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of the program as whole: ‘if the Science is left out in favour of commercialization issues I 
believe the image and product of the CRCs will suffer considerably’ said an environmental 
scientist working for government agency. 
Some participants reacted personally to these problems. One ex-industry researchers 
suggested that ‘evasion’ takes place: 
The CRCs message as conveyed by the CEO, the Executive Research Committee and 
the relevant program coordinator has been effectively ignored by project leaders, who 
have been protected by their institution’s management (CRC survey respondent, 2005) 
 
‘Exit’ is an option too. Several respondents reported that they were quitting An early-
career academic commented, ‘my attempts to maintain an external collaboration tore me 
apart (double management reporting presentation etc) so much that I am leaving this job 
with the CRC to take a regular funded position overseas’. Others had ‘decided not to 
participate in other CRCs’, or, more forcefully, ‘it has clarified my directions—I never want 
to work with one again’. At the organizational level, selective exit was considered: ‘Some 
projects were withdrawn from the CRC so that a higher level of external investment and low 
level of encumbrance could be achieved’ revealed a senior government manager. 
In highlighting these different aspects of competition we argue that they reveal 
different ‘functional domains’ that co-exist within the centre and across the partner 
organizations. Individual participants’ expectations are formative in defining these domains 
– for example, adherence to the norms of science, or expectation of advancement in an 
academic career – but their management and interrelationships are matters for the 
organizational partners. Without effective institutional management, individual participants 
have little redress but withdrawal. 
The survey comments reveal that participants have a clear expectation of the benefits 
that their centre membership will provide, clear benchmarks on how to assess their 
collaborative partners behaviour, and strong ideas on how the centre is run cooperatively 
with the least administrative burden. When it came to identifying the problems with 
collaboration there is multiple evidence of competing performance demands, ‘divided 
loyalties’, lack of awareness of performance measures in partner organizations, lack of a 
career path, hampering of access to publication or funding opportunities, and lack of a 
fundamental or longer term view of research. This provides evidence of both individual and 
institutional ‘role strain’. It also suggests that the risks of collaboration are borne both by the 
individual researchers and by the institutional partners. The individual feels this risk to their 
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career trajectory – whether being tied to unproductive research, or out of a job - while the 
institution considers opportunity costs and detriment to other staff or activities. 
 
5   Conclusions:  
5.1 Negotiating open science, trust and careers 
The chapter distils the views of more than 200 participants in a particular form of cross-
sector research centre in Australia. We conclude that the working environment and 
sustainability of such centres cannot be understood by looking solely at the individual 
choices of researchers, nor solely at the strategies of the partner organizations. Both are 
formative, and both, in turn, are influenced by the broader institutional and policy contexts 
in which they operate.  In highlighting important management issues which have been 
recognized generally within IORs and illuminating these with the views of the CRC 
participants we aim to improve the management of the dynamic organizations that are 
collaborative R&D centres. The IOR perspective is useful is emphasising the role of trust in 
loosely collaborative relationships, the ambiguity of formal governance, and the co-
existence of organizational ‘functional domains’ which have the potential to compete or 
conflict. These are issues that have not been ignored in relation to cross-sector R&D, but 
have perhaps been under-researched. 
Our respondents tended to see the benefits of the CRC first in terms of advantage to 
their own research career and second in terms of the ‘scientific’ domain in which their career 
resided. Their most immediate concern seemed to be that of their own career—how they 
were able to perform their research, their conditions and rewards—their prospects for 
advancement. They regarded as a cost or a burden anything (administration, reporting, short-
termism, constraints on publication) that diverted them from their research career. At the 
same time, the presence of commercial partners and the government’s goals for the CRC 
program, which imposed a commercial imperative on the collaboration, was not unwelcome 
in itself. In this sense our findings are unremarkable: the respondents’ expectations are not 
that different from those found in other research groups ‘at the interface of, university 
research’ (Harvey, Pettigrew and Ferlie 2002). What our findings do show is that CRC 
researchers frame their identity primarily in terms of a culture of open science, built on the 
quality and validity of research performed, which is ensured through public sharing of 
knowledge (Liebeskind and Oliver 1998; Ziman 1991). 
The second conclusion we draw is in relation to the importance of informal ‘trust’ by 
comparison with formal governance of the centres. Respondents were quite clear in the 
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importance they attached to their research partners’ competence and commitment. However 
they were far more ambiguous about the governance and coordination activities of the 
centres. There are two ways of looking at how cooperation can be ensured: (1) a social 
theory approach—reciprocity, mutual forbearance, relational trust (based on experience); 
and (2) using transaction cost economics—with the concept of opportunism (not acting 
cooperatively), and monitoring of performance, sanctions (legal punishment, penalties and 
so on) (Menard 2004; Handy 1995; Nooteboom 2000). While the level of administration and 
reporting in the CRCs might imply the latter approach, in reality, any form of imposed 
sanction was viewed by respondents most unfavourably. Thus, although the collaboration 
between the partner organizations is contractual (because they are legal entities), its 
implementation and enforcement at the level of the department and individual researcher 
appears to be informal. This raises the question of effective coordination in a multi-
institutional environment, where the partners and individual researchers essentially remain 
free agents, despite contractual commitments. 
Respondents were clearly expecting reciprocity in the degree of commitment and 
expertise, provision of resources and information, forbearance of different ways of working 
and an absence of opportunism. Any evidence of a breach caused respondents to become 
less enthusiastic about the centre, and sometimes to quit the CRC. Monitoring of 
performance might have helped to identify breaches, but there were few sanctions that could 
be applied on one partner by another. The only sanction therefore was to withdraw, or 
threaten to withdraw, from current or future collaboration, thus breaking the durability of the 
relationship.  
The findings support the need to consider closely the ‘costs of coordination and 
relationship development in these collaborations’ (Cummings and Kiesler 2005:704). But in 
contrast to Cummings and Kiesler’s claim that greater trust and respect is associated with 
more frequent communication, respondents in our survey did not universally applaud effort 
on formal ‘communication activities’. Further research is clearly warranted on how formal 
activities within the centres can buttress rather than undermine construction of trust between 
the partners in different settings.  
Lastly, our findings suggest the existence of a range of tensions and competing 
demands within cross-sector R&D arrangements which go beyond the notion of individual 
‘role strain’. Certainly individual scientists may become torn between the objectives of their 
own academic ‘identity’, the norms and requirements of their university department and 
scientific discipline and the mission of the CRC. Our survey shows that many of the 
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participants will not accept a high ‘power distance’ and expect to be allowed to behave in an 
‘individualistic’ manner (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005) in relation to their scientific 
creativity. These tensions imply an institutional as well as an individual response. For 
example, if we consider the management problem of ‘threat of exit’ we need to recognize 
that this ‘threat point’ can occur at different levels. It is possible for a researcher (academic 
level) to decide to or threaten to withdraw from CRC participation, even though continued 
participation may be to the benefit of their discipline (scientific) or laboratory/university 
(organizational). 
Managing an organization like a CRC requires recognition of the needs of these 
different functional domains and relationships, as well as an understanding of the 
competition that they provoke. This includes the potential for conflict internally over 
governance and strategy and between the CRCs and the norms and practices of the 
contributing partners. Intangible benefits and their implications for individuals’ careers are 
important factors that motivate researchers to participate in CRCs. Organizational partners 
are usually seeking more tangible outcomes although they too are also motivated by the 
potential for enhanced scientific prestige. As centres endure some of these expectations are 
met and some are not. Individuals and organizational partners will continue to negotiate the 
costs and benefits of meeting their expectations. As the process unfolds for individuals and 
organizational partners some will come and some will go. Consequently it is likely that 
while there are conflicts of interest to be resolved the centre identities will continue to be 
renegotiated. 
We have shown that the experience of researchers in CRCs is coloured by influences 
operating at several different levels. First is the broad national policy environment. CRCs 
are funded under a federal government program, in place for over two decades. Over this 
period, government funding has remained relatively static in dollar terms. These funds have 
leveraged increasing contributions from other participants, notably industry and universities. 
The funding guidelines for the program, and government rhetoric, have reflected changing 
currents in the policy debate over the function of such cross-sectoral R&D centres, and have 
led to several significant changes in direction and focus for the centres. Unrelated to the 
CRC program, but affecting it have been other shifts in the national system, such as the 
declining role of government laboratories and the growth of the university sector. As a 
consequence the role of government as a research partners in the CRCs has declined 
substantially.  
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Second is the immediate institutional, scientific and sectoral context of the particular 
CRC. Universities will adopt different approaches to managing their involvement in CRCs. 
The drivers and performance measures of CRCs in the medical prosthetics or growth factors 
sectors are quite different from those of centres in Aboriginal health or greenhouse gas 
accounting.  
Lastly is the immediate organizational management of the CRC itself and the 
relationship between its researchers and with its partners. The Australian CRCs embody 
many features of ‘Mode 2’ collaborative science, with its flexibility and ability to respond to 
contextual changes in science itself and in the application of science. Indeed it may be 
counterproductive for individual CRCs to become entrenched. However, if the important 
role of cross-sectoral collaborative R&D centres is to be retained without damage to the 
science and innovation system as a whole, the ‘academic’ and ‘scientific’ domains that we 
describe must be nurtured, not eroded. This may require new styles of management, by the 
CRCs themselves and their participant organizations, which recognize the knowledge 
resources—the scientific disciplines and careers of individual researchers on which they are 
founded. 
 
5.2  Broader policy implications 
It has been claimed that one of the outcomes of CRC funding has been their formative role 
in acting as agents of change in the university research system. The question is important 
because as government sponsored collaborative research programs have expanded so too has 
their potential to transform career patterns of researchers, the disciplinary boundaries in 
universities and the organizational structures and regulations that govern them. The current 
review suggests two further lines of investigation. The first is the effect of scales and forms 
of organization on cross-sector R&D outcomes while the second is in relation to the 
dynamics and sustainability of cooperative centres.  
Scale and forms of organization constrain the management issues. For example, in 
European studies (Jacob 2000:25) the question of ‘is Mode 2 research worth it from the 
individual researcher’s point of view?’ is couched in terms of disadvantaged ‘contract’ 
researchers (in the centres) on the one hand, in contrast to well-resourced ‘tenured’ 
academics (in traditional university departments) on the other.  In the Australian CRCs the 
situation is more akin to the US model described by Boardman and Bozeman (2007) where 
researchers face competing demands. The majority of academic researchers retain their 
existing university position, and agree to commit a proportion of their time to the 
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collaboration. Similarly, government researchers are not seconded to the CRC but remain 
employed by their partner organization. Relatively few researchers (with the exception 
notably of postdoctoral fellows) are employed directly by the CRC itself. In this regard, 
CRCs are perhaps atypical of cross-sector R&D centres which directly employ staff or 
second them full time on contract.  
It also raises the question of how durable the cross-sector R&D organizations are and 
how their management can change over time. On one hand, this form of organization is 
becoming more dominant. On the other, the collaborations need to remain flexible and 
responsive with ‘ceaseless reconfiguration of resources, knowledge and skills’ (Gibbons et 
al. 1994:47). CRCs are not ‘cooperatives’ in the sense of being member-based, 
democratically controlled organizations. But they may start this way, recruiting voluntary 
participants in the bid for grant funding. In terms of Handy’s four organizational ‘cultures’ 
(power/role/task/person) they start as a ‘person culture’ and move into a ‘task culture’ once 
goals are agreed and funding achieved. This sequences implies a balance between 
cooperation and cohesion (which, to some extent, implies control), a view endorsed by 
Chompalov et al. (2002:752) who ‘suggest that collaborations be viewed in terms of the 
principle that ‘consensus precedes hierarchy’’. CRCs start as cooperative bids, but must 
develop more cohesion and coordination to be effective. The problems, as Nooteboom 
(2000) observes, is that if networks are too cohesive they may become exclusionary, and if 
too durable they create inertia. They may be very effective for particular well defined tasks, 
but in the process they lose flexibility and ability to change. At the extremes, two scenarios 
may play out in the life cycle of a CRC. First, is ‘disintegration’, where the ground rules are 
either too weak or not accepted or adhered to by all partners and individual participants. The 
second is ‘integration’, where the rules are so effective that they stifle change—perhaps for 
good reason, such as a focus on commercial production. We conjecture that CRCs that form 
as a stimulating cooperative research environment may change into a setting that some 
researchers find unproductive or frustrating to their science or their careers. They usually 
have the option of retreating to their ‘parent’ organization and leave the collaboration if the 
strain becomes too great. We were unable to make a longitudinal study of particular CRCs, 
although we were able to contrast the views of researchers who had been associated with the 
CRC program for shorter or longer periods. This speculative proposition therefore needs 
testing through further longitudinal studies of cross-sector R&D organizations. 
 
 
34 
Acknowledgements 
This project was supported in part by an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant No. 
DP0211298, ‘Managing the risks of cross-sector R&D collaboration’. We thank: Jörg 
Sydow for his helpful critique of an earlier version of this paper, which we presented at the 
European Group for Organizational Studies (EGOS) 22nd Colloquium, Bergen, Norway, in 
July 2006; Magnus Gulbrandson for productive discussion; four anonymous reviews for 
their comments; Denis Gray for helpful suggestions and Sarah Endacott for editorial advice. 
This chapter is an expanded version of Garrett-Jones et al. (2010).  
 
References 
Boardman, C., & Bozeman, B. (2007). Role strain in university research centers. The 
Journal of Higher Education, 78: 430-463. 
Box, S., & Cotgrove, S. (1966). Scientific identity, occupational selection, and role strain. 
British Journal of Sociology, 17: 20-28. 
Çalişkan, K. & Callon, M. (2010). ‘Economization, part 2: a research programme for the 
study of markets, Economy & Society, 39(1): 1-32. 
Castells, M. (2001). The Internet galaxy: reflections on the Internet, business, and society. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Chompalov, I., Genuth, J., & Shrum, W. (2002). The organization of scientific 
collaborations. Research Policy, 31: 749-767. 
Cummings, J. N., & Kiesler, S. (2005). Collaborative research across disciplinary and 
organizational boundaries. Social Studies of Science, 35: 703-722. 
Cummings, J. N., & Kiesler, S. (2007). Coordination costs and project outcomes in multi-
university collaborations. Research Policy, 36: 1620-1634. 
Diment, K., & Garrett-Jones, S. (2007). How demographic characteristics affect mode 
preference in a postal/web mixed-mode survey of Australian researchers. Social Science 
Computer Review, 25: 410-417. 
DIISR (Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research) (2010a). Program 
Guidelines: Cooperative Research Centres Program, DIISR, Canberra. 
DIISR (Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research) (2010b). CRC Directory 
2010-11, DIISR, Canberra. 
Elzinga, A. (2004). The New Production of Reductionism in Models relating to Research 
Policy. In Grandin, K., Wormbs, N., & Widmalm, S. (eds.), The Science-industry Nexus: 
History, Policy, Implications: Nobel Symposium 123: 277-304. USA: Science History 
Publications. 
Etzkowitz, H., & Leydesdorff, L. (1997). Universities and the Global Knowledge Economy: 
A Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations. London and Washington: 
Pinter. 
Fulop, L., & Couchman, P. (2006). Facing up to the risks in commercially focused 
university–industry R&D partnerships. Higher Education Research & Development, 25: 
163-177. 
 
35 
Garrett-Jones, S., & Turpin, T. (2002). Measuring the Outcomes of the CRC Program: A 
Framework - Final Report. Canberra: Dept. of Education, Science and Training. 
Garrett-Jones, S., & Turpin, T. (2007). The Triple Helix and institutional change: Reward, 
risk and response in Australian Cooperative Research Centres. Triple Helix VI: 6th 
International Conference on University, Industry and Government Linkages -- Emerging 
Models for the Entrepreneurial University: Regional Diversities or Global Convergence. 
National University of Singapore (NUS), Singapore: Research Publishing Services. 
Garrett-Jones, S., Turpin, T., Burns, P., & Diment, K. (2005a). Common purpose and 
divided loyalties: the risks and rewards of cross-sector collaboration for academic and 
government researchers. R&D Management, 35(5): 535-544. 
Garrett-Jones, S., Turpin, T., & Diment, K. (2005b). Different cultures, different 
perspectives: the experiences of academic and government researchers in collaborative R&D 
centres. Paper presented at the The R&D Management Conference 2005: Organising R&D 
Activities - A Balancing Act, Pisa, Italy: Manchester, RADMA. 
Garrett-Jones, S., Turpin, T., & Diment, K. (2010). Managing competition between 
individual and organizational goals in cross-sector research and development centres. 
Journal of Technology Transfer, 35(5): 527-546. 
Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P., & Trow, M. (1994). 
The new production of knowledge: The dynamics of science and research in contemporary 
societies. London: Sage. 
Gray, Denis (2011) Cross sector research collaboration in the USA: a national innovation 
system perspective, Science and Public Policy, 38(2): 123-134. 
Gulbrandsen, M. (2000). Between Scylla and Charybdis - and enjoying it? Organizational 
tension and research work. Science Studies 13: 53-76. 
Handy, C. (1995). Trust and the virtual organization. Harvard Business Review, May-June: 
39-50. 
Handy, C. B. (1993). Understanding organizations. London: Penguin Books. 
Harvey, J., Pettigrew, A., & Ferlie, E. 2002. The determinants of research group 
performance: Towards Mode 2? Journal of Management Studies, 39: 747-774. 
Hatch, M. J. (1997). Organization theory: Modern, symbolic, and postmodern perspectives. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Henkel, M. (2004). Current Science Policies and their Implications for the Formation and 
Maintenance of Academic Identity. Higher Education Policy, 17: 167-182. 
Hofstede, G., & Hofstede, G. J. (2005). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Holland, C. P., & Lockett, A. G. (1998). Business Trust and the Formation of Virtual 
Organizations. 31st Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences: 602-610: 
IEEE. 
Howells, J. & Edler, J. (2011) Structural innovations: towards a unified perspective, Science 
and Public Policy, 38(2): 157-167. 
 
36 
Jacob, M. (2000). ‘Mode 2’ in Context: The Contract Researcher, the University and the 
Knowledge Society. In Jacob, M., & Hellstrom, T. (eds.), The Future of Knowledge 
Production in the Academy: 11-27. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
Jarvenpaa, S. L., & Leidner, D. E. 1999. Communication and Trust in Global Virtual Teams. 
Organization Science, 10: 791-815. 
Lamb, R., & Davidson, E. (2004). Hybrid organization in high-tech enterprise, E-Global: 
17th Bled e-Commerce Conference. Bled, Slovenia. 
Leydesdorff, L., & Etzkowitz, H. (2001). The Transformation of University-industry-
government Relations. Electronic Journal of Sociology. 
http://www.sociology.org/archive.html. Accessed 11 June 2008. 
Liebeskind, J. P., & Oliver, A. L. (1998). From Handshake to Contract: Intellectual 
Property, Trust, and the Social Structure of Academic Research,’ in. In Lane, C., & 
Bachmann, R. (eds.), Trust Within and Between Organizations: 118-145. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Menard, C. (2004). The Economics of Hybrid Organizations. Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics - JITE, 160: 345–376. 
Merton, R. K., & Barber, E. (1976). Sociological Ambivalence [originally published 1963]. 
In Merton, R. K. (ed.), Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays: 3-31. New York: The 
Free Press. 
Minkoff, D. C. (2002). The Emergence of Hybrid Organizational Forms: Combining 
Identity-Based Service Provision and Political Action. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 31: 377-401. 
Nooteboom, B. (2000). Institutions and Forms of Co-ordination in Innovation Systems. 
Organization Studies, 21: 915-939. 
OECD (2004). ‘Public-private partnerships for research and innovation: an evaluation of the 
Australian experience’, OECD, Paris. 
O’Kane, M. (2008). Collaborating to a purpose: Review of the Cooperative Research 
Centres Program (Chair: Mary O’Kane). Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 
Collaboration Working Group of the National Innovation System Review Panel. 
Peacock, T. (2011) ‘Disappointment but no surprises in funding round results to date’. 
Cooperative Research News, September 2011, CRC Association, Canberra. 
Pelz, D. C., & Andrews, F. M. (1976). Scientists in organizations: productive climates for 
research and development (Revised Edition). Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 
University of Michigan. 
Productivity Commission (2007). Public Support for Science and Innovation, Research 
Report, Commonwealth of Australia, March, 2007. 
Rip, A. (2000). Fashions, Lock-ins and the Heterogeneity of Knowledge Production. In 
Jacob, M., & Hellstrom, T. (eds.), The Future of Knowledge Production in the Academy: 28-
39. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
 
37 
Shove, E. (2000). Reciprocities and Reputations: New Currencies in Research. In Jacob, M., 
& Hellstrom, T. (eds.), The Future of Knowledge Production in the Academy: 63-80. Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press. 
Schiller, D. (2011) Institutions and practices in cross-sector research collaboration: 
conceptual considerations with empirical illustrations from the German science sector, 
Science and Public Policy, 38(2): 109-122. 
Steenhuis, H.-J., & Gray, D. O. (2006). Cooperative research and technology dynamics: the 
role of research strategy development in NSF Science and Technology Centres. 
International Journal of Technology Transfer and Commercialisation, 5: 56-78. 
Turpin, T., & Garrett-Jones, S. (2000). Mapping the New Cultures and Organization of 
Research in Australia. In Weingart, P., & Stehr, N. (eds.), Practising Interdisciplinarity: 79-
109. Toronto, Buffalo, London: Toronto University Press. 
Turpin, T., Garrett-Jones, S., & Diment, K. (2005). Scientists, career choices and 
organizational change: Managing human resources in cross-sector R&D organizations. 
Journal of the Australian and New Zealand Academy of Management, 11: 13-26. 
Turpin, T., Garrett-Jones, S., & Rankin, N. (1996). Bricoleurs and boundary riders: 
managing basic research and innovation knowledge networks. R&D Management, 26(3): 
267-282. 
Turpin, T., Garrett-Jones, S., & Woolley, R. (2011) Cross sector research collaboration in 
Australia: the cooperative research centres program at the cross roads’ Science and Public 
Policy, 38(2): 87-98. 
Ziman, J. (1991). Academic science as a system of markets. Higher Education Quarterly, 
45: 41-61. 
  
 
38 
Table 1 Evolving CRC Program objectives over the 12 funding rounds from 1990 – 2010  
 
1990-92 
 
 
2000-02 
 
2004-06 
 
2009-10 
To support long-term high-
quality scientific and 
technological research 
which contributes to 
national objectives, 
including economic and 
social development, the 
maintenance of a strong 
capability in basic research 
and the development of 
internationally competitive 
industry sectors; 
To capture the benefits of 
research, and to strengthen 
the links between research 
and its commercial and 
other applications, by the 
active involvement of the 
users of research in the 
work of the Centres; 
To build Centres of 
research concentration by 
promoting cooperative 
research, and through it a 
more efficient use of 
resources in the national 
research effort; 
To stimulate education and 
training, particularly in 
graduate programs, through 
the active involvement of 
researchers from outside the 
higher education system in 
educational activities, and 
graduate students in major 
research programs. 
To enhance the 
contribution of long-
term scientific and 
technological 
research and 
innovation to 
Australia’s 
sustainable 
economic and social 
development; 
To enhance the 
transfer of research 
output into 
commercial or other 
outcomes of 
economic, 
environmental or 
social benefit to 
Australia; 
To enhance the 
value to Australia of 
graduate 
researchers; and 
To enhance 
collaboration among 
researchers, between 
researchers and 
industry or other 
users, and to 
improve efficiency 
in the use of 
intellectual and 
other research 
resources. 
To enhance 
Australia’s 
industrial, 
commercial and 
economic growth 
through the 
development of 
sustained, user-
driven cooperative 
public-private 
research centres that 
achieve high levels 
of outcomes in 
adoption and 
commercialisation. 
To deliver significant 
economic, 
environmental and 
social benefits to 
Australia by supporting 
end-user driven 
research partnerships 
between publicly 
funded researchers and 
end-users to address 
clearly articulated, 
major challenges that 
require medium to 
long-term collaborative 
efforts. 
Source: O’Kane, 2008; DIISR, 2010a. 
 
  
 
39 
Table 2 CRC Program funding and contributions by selection round, 1990 to 2006 
 
Contributions A$ million  (current prices)           
Selection Round 1990 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Sub-total 
1990 - 
1996 
Sub-total 
1998 - 
2006 
Total 
 
CRC Program Funding 
       
253.8  
       
199.2  
       
175.8  
       
141.6  
       
231.9  
       
410.2  
       
323.2  
       
473.0  
       
414.0  
       
317.8  
       
1,002.3  
       
1,938.2  
       
2,940.5  
 
Universities 
       
174.4  
       
166.0  
       
135.5  
       
111.2  
       
183.4  
       
478.8  
       
488.8  
       
704.6  
       
273.6  
       
231.5  
          
770.5  
       
2,177.3  
       
2,947.8  
   
Sub-total Go8 
Universities 
       
140.9  
         
85.3  
         
61.9  
         
37.8  
         
77.2  
       
278.4  
       
302.7  
       
278.2  
       
124.3  
         
73.8  
          
403.1  
       
1,057.4  
       
1,460.5  
 
CSIRO 
       
143.5  
         
96.2  
       
115.8  
         
66.0  
         
98.1  
       
196.2  
       
141.5  
       
101.3  
       
109.2  
         
32.2  
          
519.6  
          
580.4  
       
1,100.0  
 
Industry 
       
113.6  
         
61.9  
         
69.5  
         
72.5  
       
176.0  
       
303.9  
       
195.5  
       
456.8  
       
230.6  
       
253.6  
          
493.5  
       
1,440.4  
       
1,933.9  
 
Industry associations 
         
18.5  
         
15.8  
           
3.9  
         
24.6  
         
22.2  
         
45.0  
         
72.4  
         
62.6  
         
69.3  
         
71.8  
            
85.0  
          
321.1  
          
406.1  
 
Federal Government 
(excl. CRC Program 
Funding) 
         
44.2  
         
32.7  
         
20.8  
           
8.3  
         
31.0  
         
99.4  
         
34.3  
       
119.7  
         
32.8  
         
18.8  
          
137.0  
          
305.0  
          
442.0  
 
State Government 
         
32.8  
         
71.2  
         
81.7  
         
83.8  
         
58.9  
       
216.9  
       
258.8  
       
223.4  
       
191.2  
       
121.8  
          
328.4  
       
1,012.1  
       
1,340.5  
 
Other 
         
63.9  
         
16.7  
           
3.4  
         
15.8  
         
95.3  
         
75.5  
         
32.6  
       
206.2  
           
9.8  
       
104.0  
          
195.1  
          
428.1  
          
623.2  
 
Total contributions 
(excl. CRC Program 
Funding) 
       
590.9  
       
460.5  
       
430.6  
       
382.2  
       
664.9  
    
1,415.7  
    
1,223.9  
    
1,874.6  
       
916.5  
       
833.7  
       
2,529.1  
       
6,264.4  
       
8,793.5  
 
Total  
     
844.7 
     
659.7  
     
606.4  
     
523.8  
     
896.8  
   
1,825.9  
   
1,547.1  
   
2,347.6 
   
1,330.5  
   
1,151.5  
       
3,531.4  
       
8,202.6  
   
11,734.0  
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 Per cent of total             
Selection Round 1990 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Sub-total 
1990 - 
1996 
Sub-total 
1998 - 
2006 
Total 
 
CRC Program Funding 
         
30.0  
         
30.2  
         
29.0  
         
27.0  
         
25.9  
         
22.5  
         
20.9  
         
20.1  
         
31.1  
         
27.6  
            
28.4  
            
23.6  
            
25.1  
 
Universities 
         
20.6  
         
25.2  
         
22.3  
         
21.2  
         
20.5  
         
26.2  
         
31.6  
         
30.0  
         
20.6  
         
20.1  
            
21.8  
            
26.5  
            
25.1  
   
Sub-total Go8 
Universities 
         
16.7  
         
12.9  
         
10.2  
           
7.2  
           
8.6  
         
15.2  
         
19.6  
         
11.9  
           
9.3  
           
6.4  
            
11.4  
            
12.9  
            
12.4  
 
CSIRO 
         
17.0  
         
14.6  
         
19.1  
         
12.6  
         
10.9  
         
10.7  
           
9.1  
           
4.3  
           
8.2  
           
2.8  
            
14.7  
              
7.1  
              
9.4  
 
Industry 
         
13.4  
           
9.4  
         
11.5  
         
13.8  
         
19.6  
         
16.6  
         
12.6  
         
19.5  
         
17.3  
         
22.0  
            
14.0  
            
17.6  
            
16.5  
 
Industry associations 
           
2.2  
           
2.4  
           
0.6  
           
4.7  
           
2.5  
           
2.5  
           
4.7  
           
2.7  
           
5.2  
           
6.2  
              
2.4  
              
3.9  
              
3.5  
 
Federal Government 
(excl. CRC Program 
Funding) 
           
5.2  
           
5.0  
           
3.4  
           
1.6  
           
3.5  
           
5.4  
           
2.2  
           
5.1  
           
2.5  
           
1.6  
              
3.9  
              
3.7  
              
3.8  
 
State Government 
           
3.9  
         
10.8  
         
13.5  
         
16.0  
           
6.6  
         
11.9  
         
16.7  
           
9.5  
         
14.4  
         
10.6  
              
9.3  
            
12.3  
            
11.4  
 
Other 
           
7.6  
           
2.5  
           
0.6  
           
3.0  
         
10.6  
           
4.1  
           
2.1  
           
8.8  
           
0.7  
           
9.0  
              
5.5  
              
5.2  
              
5.3  
 
Total contributions 
(excl. CRC Program 
Funding) 
         
70.0  
         
69.8  
         
71.0  
         
73.0  
         
74.1  
         
77.5  
         
79.1  
         
79.9  
         
68.9  
         
72.4  
            
71.6  
            
76.4  
            
74.9  
 
Total  
       
100.0  
       
100.0  
       
100.0  
       
100.0  
       
100.0  
       
100.0  
       
100.0  
       
100.0  
       
100.0  
       
100.0  
          
100.0  
          
100.0  
          
100.0  
 
Leveraging (CRC 
Program funds: 
Contributions) 
           
2.3  
           
2.3  
           
2.4  
           
2.7  
           
2.9  
           
3.5  
           
3.8  
           
4.0  
           
2.2  
           
2.6  
              
2.5  
              
3.2  
              
3.0  
Source: O’Kane (2008), Appendix 4
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Table 3 Demography of survey respondents 
Sector of 
employment CRC 
Higher 
Education 
Government 
Research (a) 
Government 
Other (b) Other (c) Total 
Number of respondents 
34 196 78 43 19 370 
Proportion of respondents 
9.2% 53.0% 21.1% 11.6% 5.2% 100.0% 
Number of respondents 
answering open-ended 
questions 
18 108 45 23 12 209 
Proportion of respondents in 
category answering open-
ended questions 
52.9% 55.1% 57.7% 53.5% 63.2% 56.5% 
(a) A government organization whose primary purpose is research 
(b) A government organization whose primary purpose is other than research 
(c) ‘Other’ includes currently unemployed respondents, private consultants, staff employed by business 
subsidiaries of the public organizations etc.  
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Table 4  Example of hierarchical ‘nodes’ used in NVivo coding of responses 
 
1. Problems 
1.1. Between partners 
1.1.1.  Trust 
1.1.1.1.   Competence 
1.1.1.2.   Intention/opportunism 
1.1.1.2.1.  Attitude 
1.1.1.2.2.  Funding/resources 
1.1.1.2.3.  Control/domination 
1.2. Within home organization 
1.2.1.  Resources/time 
1.2.1.1.  Lack of support 
1.2.1.2.  Competition for resources 
1.2.2.  Rewards 
1.2.2.1.  Lack of recognition 
1.3. In management of CRC 
1.3.1.  Transaction costs, bureaucracy 
1.3.1.1.  Burden of reporting, dual reporting 
1.3.2.  Conflict with norms of science 
1.3.2.1.  Publication restrictions 
1.3.2.2.  IP ownership 
 
 
 
